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Abstract
The paper addresses the problem of pursuing ethical business practices purely under the aegis of ‘integrity’, as frequently 
used to characterise morally desirable traits. Drawing on the work of philosopher Thomas Kasulis, the paper pairs ‘integrity’ 
with ‘intimacy’ as a critical concept, placing greater attention upon relational properties, helping to understand ethics as 
existing between individuals, things and the environment. The argument is that by paying careful attention to spatial and 
temporal dynamics and proximities of exchange, businesses can better maintain and extend practices of integrity. It reminds 
us that ethics are developmental (not transcendental); that the cultivation of ethics provides greater depth and ownership 
and pertains to matters of the body and habits. The paper contributes a way of reading exchanges in the marketplace beyond 
prescriptive accounts of integrity. Through the lens of both integrity and intimacy, it identifies how we actually ‘live’ or 
practice greater responsiveness to exchanges.
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Response‑Ability: Practicing Integrity 
Through Intimacy in the Marketplace
In thinking through an ethics of both integrity and inti-
macy, this paper argues for a more nuanced reading of how 
‘responsible’ exchanges take place in the everyday market-
place. Of particular pertinence is the way in which individu-
als interact in the service domain.1 As Audi and Murphy 
(2006, p. 3) note, integrity is a key topic in business ethics, 
‘quite possibly the most commonly cited morally desirable 
trait’. In the business context, integrity is commonly under-
stood in terms of responsible management and leadership 
(Bauman 2013). Yet, historically this term has lacked clear 
articulation, and furthermore it can often signify ‘a trait that 
is good in itself without constituting a moral virtue’ (Audi 
and Murphy 2006, pp. 12–13). Rather than examining the 
higher-level rhetoric and company strategies of integrity, 
this paper situates the term at the level of person-to-person 
interaction, relating to sites of everyday market exchange. 
In doing so, it draws attention to a more phenomenological 
and quotidian experience of market exchange.
The paper draws specifically upon Kasulis’ (2002) 
account of integrity and intimacy, with the latter refer-
ring to ‘an inseparability, a belonging together, a sharing’ 
(p. 24), involving, for example, the sharing of tacit knowl-
edge and greater awareness of situations and of the connec-
tion between one and another. Importantly, this is not the 
intimacy of lovers, but rather underlying structures (or we 
might say the medium) of exchange between people. ‘We 
speak of the intimate relation between flora and fauna in a 
particular ecosystem, for example, or between matter and 
energy in the context of particle physics. In such cases, we 
cannot fully understand one side of the pair without consid-
eration of the other’ (Kasulis 2002, p. 28). However, despite 
describing a relationship between intimacy and integrity, 
Kasulis tends to set the two terms in contrast (often pre-
senting them with the grammatical operator ‘or’ not ‘and’). 
This paper draws on the insights of his work, but seeks to 
extend the account in two ways. Firstly, it explores intimacy 
in relation to integrity specifically in the context of business 
 * Kyoko Fukukawa 
 k.fukukawa@bradford.ac.uk
1 School of Management, University of Bradford, Emm Lane, 
Bradford, West Yorkshire BD9 4JL, UK
1 The analysis of the paper focuses upon services, rather than goods, 
although as the literatures of ‘service-dominant logic’ suggest, even 
goods are largely marketed through the means of services (Vargo and 
Lusch 2008).
252 K. Fukukawa 
1 3
and business ethics. In this sense, it applies Kasulis’ work 
in a new context. Secondly, the paper seeks to put forward 
the potential of an Integrity-Intimacy approach, to suggest 
of a critical, dialectical approach, which ideally can lead to 
further research initiatives and also impact on practical busi-
ness endeavours, such as employee training and the design 
of customer settings (as referenced in the latter half of this 
paper, and outlined in implications).
In his book Intimacy or Integrity (2002), Kasulis presents 
what he calls a ‘cultural philosophy’. He is interested in how 
we think about the relations among people and things accord-
ing to cultural backgrounds. However, importantly, his argu-
ments move beyond cultural relativism. He is interested in 
patterns of relations that construct cultures (in this respect 
his work can be made to connect with Bourdieu’s critical 
term habitus, as will be discussed later, through which we 
can analyse a range of settings, discourses and structures 
of exchange). These patterns can alter and scale according 
to numerous factors and are certainly not fixed to national 
cultures. Thus, Kasulis’ work can readily be applied to spe-
cific situations, such as business and/or consumer cultures, 
as attempted here. In seeking to put forward an Integrity-
Intimacy approach, the paper picks up particularly on the 
philosophical prompt that ‘intimacy’ can be made observ-
able. The paper extends this point, to allow the empirical 
nature of intimacy (within the context of the marketplace) to 
be made more explicit, which in turn opens up future agendas 
for training and management of business ethics more broadly. 
Crucially, it is an account that can help us to consider market 
exchanges as defined not by a single individual or site of ori-
gin, but rather through relational means, which in turn ena-
bles us to reappraise ethics in the context of the marketplace.
The paper can also be said to echo Robert Solomon 
(1992, p. 111) when he suggests we ‘defend business ethics 
as a more personally oriented ethics rather than as public 
policy, “applied” abstract philosophy’. Importantly, again to 
echo Solomon, the paper does not seek to be drawn into gen-
dered readings of ‘care ethics’, whereby a ‘sharp contrast’ is 
drawn ‘between the good warm, feminine virtues of caring 
and concern and the oppressive, impersonal, war-mongering 
masculine principles of justice and duty’ (p. 116). Instead, 
the point is to consider a more underlying, sharable array of 
characteristics and capabilities that we might cultivate. The 
point, then, is not to conceive of business ethics as ‘per-
sonal’ or ‘subjective’, but rather to identify a ‘social and 
institutional self-awareness, a sense of oneself as an inti-
mate (but not inseparable) part of the business world with 
a keen sense of the virtues and values of that world’ (Solo-
mon 1992, p. 111). As a contribution to business ethics, this 
paper offers a way of reading various exchanges in the mar-
ketplace that go beyond prescriptive accounts of integrity, 
and instead, through the lens of both integrity and intimacy, 
identifies how, together, we actually ‘live’ or practice matters 
of integrity. Crucially, intimacy is to be understood as a sub-
tle, yet observable set of qualities, the development of which 
has the potential to enable businesses to better understand 
the nature and quality of their engagements with stakehold-
ers, with the particular focus in this paper on the relationship 
between provider and consumer.
Intimacy equates to greater attentiveness, hence helping 
in being more responsive to a situation and to anticipate what 
otherwise might be left unattended.2 Importantly, adopting 
the term ‘intimacy’ helps temper how we read ‘integrity’, to 
reveal an inherently social context, which involves more than 
merely possessing a sense of what is one’s responsibility. It 
requires the ability to be responsive to others and to wider 
circumstances. The modernist composer, John Cage (1957, 
p. 10), once referred to the word ‘responsibility’ as ‘response 
ability’, shifting the emphasis from an ethics of accountabil-
ity to an aesthetics of engagement.3 Similarly, the empha-
sis here is on practical sensations and responses that arise 
in given situations. In this respect, references in this paper 
to ‘responsiveness’ can be understood as being different to 
more strategy-based accounts, whereby, for example, we 
might refer to a company being responsive to its customers 
perhaps by responding directly to customer feedback etc. 
Selznick (1994) has written on ‘responsiveness enterprise’, 
to suggest of an ‘inner commitment to moral restraint’, 
that goes beyond accountability, or being held responsible 
(p. 345). He is concerned, for example, with how we might 
be ‘genuinely other-regarding’ (which, for example, draws 
in consideration of Buddhist accounts of the self). However, 
reference to an ‘inner’ quality leads back to integrity based 
upon specific sites of agency and autonomy. The account is 
analytical, which remains somewhat abstract (certainly when 
compared with the account suggested here through reference 
to intimacies). The paper is certainly sympathetic to these 
2 The paper is sympathetic to arguments made by Painter-Morland 
(2011), who breaks from traditional ways of thinking about ‘respon-
sibility’ in terms of character traits and fixed notions of identity and 
agency. She argues a different ontological account whereby ‘agency 
emerges as a side-product of our human pursuits’, leading us to need 
to ‘redefine responsibility as a commitment to ongoing responsive-
ness to changing environments, rather than as some fixed role or trait’ 
(p. 84). The account offered here shares the view that responsibility 
equates to ‘more fluid relational dynamics that emerge between indi-
viduals, groups and institutions’ (Painter-Morland 2011, p. 91). How-
ever, in applying Kasulis’s account of ‘intimacy’, the paper remains 
attuned to epistemological and empirical matters, rather than present-
ing an ontological account.
3 Aesthetics here is not to be taken as simply the study of beauty (a 
meaning that develops only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centu-
ries in Germany and England respectively), but the more fundamental 
meaning of our perception by the senses, as we get from the Greek 
term aisthētikos, which is from aisthēta, meaning ‘perceptible things’. 
What can be included, then, is not merely an ability to see or hear 
phenomena, but that which relates to emotions and sensations.
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various arguments and framings, but by invoking an aesthet-
ics of ethics (through the reference to Cage), responsiveness 
here pertains more specifically to the body, environment, 
individual and group rhythms, and other associated elements 
of exchange. A distinction is evoked later on between being 
responsive ‘to’ and being responsive ‘with’. The former 
relates more to logical and legalistic forms of exchange. The 
latter, with which this paper more readily aligns, relates to 
broader questions and situations of ‘being with’ others, and 
responding according to a variety of prompts and rhythms 
that occur through arrangements with others.
Conceptually, a parallel might be drawn with work of 
the philosopher Jacques Rancière (2004), who is frequently 
cited in debates of the ‘political aesthetic’—referring not to 
the aestheticization of politics (such as we might think of 
with propaganda or heightened symbolism etc.), but rather 
the underlying fact that all politics is mediated in some fash-
ion, that there is always a ‘sense’ of politics. This paper is 
concerned with an ethics not a politics, but similarly with the 
micro consideration of what underlies its account of respon-
sibility and responsiveness. As will be discussed, intimacy 
can be considered according to various aspects, positioned 
around ideas of proximity, anticipation and improvisation. 
Subsequently, there are practical implications for how firms 
seek to conduct their day-to-day business and how they 
might choose to invest in and develop their operations (e.g. 
through training and relationship management). In short, it 
is important not only to know who one’s stakeholders are, 
but also how to be responsive towards them.
Intimacies of Integrity
Dating back at least to Adam Smith’s account of the ‘invis-
ible hand’ and leading on through the debates epitomised by 
the positions of Friedman (of the—corporate—responsibil-
ity to maximise profits) and Freeman (for the wider needs of 
stakeholders), critical considerations have long been made 
regarding the ‘responsibilities’ of companies. Notably, as 
Painter-Morland (2011) suggests, over the past 25 years, 
‘the stakeholder perspective won out over a single-minded 
concern for shareholder profit’, yet nonetheless, while it has 
been established that ‘most corporations do have an interest 
in being responsible towards a broad range of stakeholders 
… many other issues remain unresolved’ (p. 84). Painter-
Morland argues for a relational ontology of agency, which 
destablises our ability to define who acts or makes a decision 
to cause benefit/harm to stakeholders. Pertinent to such a 
view, Kasulis’ (2002) use of the terms ‘integrity’ and ‘inti-
macy’ can be described respectively (and in brief) as the 
difference between being ‘responsible’ and ‘responsive’. 
Crucially, his pragmatic philosophy helps re-cast the reading 
we might make with existing literatures on responsiveness 
(as with the caveat noted above with respect to this paper’s 
particularly framing of responsiveness). Different to Painter-
Morland’s (2011) insightful, yet esoteric account of ‘respon-
siveness’, Kasulis can be adapted to open up more practi-
cal implications for future research in the business context, 
including analysis of spatial and temporal arrangements 
of the consumer experience. His cultural philosophy helps 
prompt a different or supplementary reading to the dominant 
ethical philosophies associated with debates of integrity and 
responsibility within the business context.
A good deal of literatures concerned with integrity in 
management focus upon defining integrity in a normative 
sense and typically refer to integrity as a matter of leader-
ship, and so consider how integrity is ‘transmitted’ through 
company practices, rather than as being relational. For Kasu-
lis, integrity equates to an adherence to codes and rules, 
which inevitably are established in some way. We can view 
this a form of transmission model, i.e. that integrity can 
emanate from a point of origin and be measured accord-
ingly. Culturally, however, points of view can vary substan-
tially. Kasulis notes how the English word for ‘rights’ is 
clearly rendered in Japanese, as ‘kenri’. In the first instance, 
from a universalist perspective. We may view this a shared 
concept. Yet, the term itself is used with vastly different 
frequency (and significance) in either the English-speaking 
or Japanese-speaking contexts (cf. Fukukawa and Teramoto 
2009, on jinken [human rights]). ‘The transfer of words or 
even ideas’, Kasulis notes, ‘from one culture to the next does 
not entail a shared cultural view of what is important’ (p. 6). 
It is important to stress, however, this is not to present an 
essentialist account. The argument is that different cultural 
contexts give rise to differing points of emphasis and con-
duct, but that these are not culturally fixed.
The more interesting analysis comes at the ‘subcultural’ 
level—which, as will be developed later in the paper, we can 
equate with Bourdieu’s notion of habitus—i.e. that individu-
als relate to the shared, social world based upon a system of 
embodied, habitual dispositions and tendencies, typically 
shared among those with similar backgrounds (Lizardo 
2004). Kasulis tells, for example, of how a doctor and a 
nurse respond to a patient’s pain in different ways, based 
upon their different types of training and professional roles. 
The doctor’s response is more associated with ‘integrity’, 
whereby she upholds her duty according to a set of rules and 
guidelines. She tells the patient that medication to ease the 
pain is not due for a set number of hours and nothing more 
could be done (keeping in mind the need to inhibit the likeli-
hood of dependency). The nurse later reassures the patient 
that if the night proves difficult again he could ring for the 
on-call doctor, who may be a little more flexible than the 
consultant. For Kasulis, the nurse (and potentially the on-
call doctor) represent a more intimate, situational approach. 
This example quickly illustrates one definition of integrity 
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and intimacy. Yet, it is problematic in suggesting too great 
a contrast, with integrity simply the upholding of rules, and 
intimacy the responding to a person’s individual situation (as 
if to bend the rules). Whereas, in fact, both cases involve a 
relationship between individuals as they negotiate differing 
matters of integrity. The view of this paper is that integrity 
and intimacy are more intricately involved.
The difference implied, however, is the degree to which 
the patient is acknowledged and brought into the conversa-
tion and decision-making. Intimacy can be understood to 
identify a form of mediation or ‘collaboration’ between par-
ties involved. Thus, rather than make specific judgements 
about integrity, this paper is concerned with how integrity 
is upheld—how it comes to be a function of a given moment 
in exchange. The introduction of the term ‘intimacy’ is to 
acknowledge and examine subtle instances of exchange. 
It is also to signify certain somatic qualities that relate to 
phenomenological and embodied forms of knowledge. 
Kasulis explains, for example, how intimate knowledge ‘is 
achieved through praxis, and it is embodied through physi-
cal style’ (2002, p. 47). He gives an example of chopping 
wood with an axe, noting how bodily movement and the 
design of the axe become a single function. We come to 
learn through doing, ‘the intimacy deepens as the praxis is 
repeated and habitualized’ (p. 43). The significance of which 
is that through praxis we reach an understanding or way of 
responding, and in a manner that is not achievable through 
theorization. In fact, one methodological difficulty is that as 
soon as we come away from the situation we arguably loose 
the ‘object’ of analysis; just as when we put the axe down, 
it no longer possesses its function as something that swings 
down and cuts. Of course, added to this is also the complex-
ity of the term integrity, which is considered below across 
its different meanings before being situated within the terms 
of intimacy, so as to combine both integrity-intimacy as an 
underlying practice.
While the word ‘integrity’ is far from straightforward, it 
is frequently used with respect to ideal personal character-
istics of professionals (both of managers and employees). 
Monga (2016) notes two streams of research: One is ‘the 
objective view which defines integrity as a morally and 
ethically neutral term’; another is ‘a normative view which 
explicitly include morality and ethics’ (Monga 2016, p. 415). 
Within the objectivist view, integrity is frequently defined in 
terms of ‘wholeness’, as, for example, ‘a state or condition 
of being whole, complete, unimpaired, unbroken, sound, in 
perfect condition’ (Jensen 2009, p. 18). In the business con-
text, ‘wholeness’ often underlines descriptions of an indi-
vidual or company’s characteristics that are thought to be 
coherent. A high degree of alignment between a company’s 
mission, strategic planning and operations, for example, 
could be considered an approach of integrity. Similarly, an 
individual manager who aligns actions with a consistent 
set of ideals can often be described as a person of integ-
rity. Empirical investigation that takes an objectivist view 
focuses on completeness and consistency between word and 
action because it is assumed that ‘honoring your word is an 
actionable pathway to creating whole and complete social 
and working relationships through being trusted by others’ 
(Monga 2016, p. 416). Within the leadership literature this 
view is labelled ‘behavioural integrity’ (Bauman 2013). 
However, such an approach has been ‘criticised because this 
concept of integrity can be applied to both a tyrant as well as 
an ethical person’ (Monga 2016, p. 416; see also; Bauman 
2013; Audi and Murphy 2006).
Alternatively, the meaning of integrity within the nor-
mative view explicitly includes morality and ethics (Monga 
2016, p. 415), and is labelled ‘moral integrity’ within lead-
ership literature, which is to ‘preclude immoral or amoral 
ideals and values’ (Krylova et al. 2017, p. 197). In this case 
‘integrity is presumed to be linked to numerous values-
related constructs including ethics, morality, honesty, and 
sincerity’ (p. 196). Inevitably, there are different accounts, 
with a notable ‘divergence of definitions of the concept of 
integrity’ (p. 196). Audi and Murphy (2006), for example, 
examine a variety of definitions of integrity which resonate 
with various moral characters (see Paine 1997; Solomon 
1992; Dalla Costa 1998; Gostick and Telford 2003; Zauderer 
1992, pp. 27–28; DeGeorge 1993). Given many different 
definitions and perspectives, it is difficult to find a unifying 
approach. Maak’s (2008) seven necessary conditions (com-
mitment, conduct, context, consistency, coherence and con-
tinuity) are, according to Monga (2016, pp. 418–419), an 
antecedent framework. Similarly, Bauman’s (2013, p. 422) 
account of what he terms ‘substantive leadership integrity’ 
seeks to define underlying characteristics. Both Maak and 
Bauman place importance on the idea of ‘commitment’. 
Bauman writes, for example, of needing to have ‘identity-
conferring commitments to values’ (p. 422). Along similar 
lines, Monga (2016, p. 419) argues, ‘at the heart of integrity 
is commitment and adherence to the sound moral principles’. 
An underlying problem with these accounts—and the way in 
which commitment of an individual is emphasised—is that 
they are suggestive of a transmission of integrity, rather than 
of a set of relations. In other words, integrity is seemingly 
borne of a singular account or upholding of certain values, 
which must be pushed through all activities of a business, 
so suggestive of a top-down approach, arguably with little 
opportunity to relating integrity to situational (and everyday) 
circumstances. This is particularly the case where integrity 
is the subject of literatures on leadership, and which con-
trasts with critical management literatures (e.g. Painter-
Morland 2011).
Audi and Murphy (2006, p. 9) go some way to recognise 
the problem, which stems from the more common reading of 
integrity as being integral to a person (or a company). The 
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logic, they note, is that ‘if honesty is integral to a person, a 
person of integrity cannot normally deliberate about whether 
or not to be honest’. Yet, in reality, ‘achieving fairness and 
balance may require deliberation and tradeoffs among con-
flicting demands’ (Audi and Murphy 2006, p. 9). Alterna-
tively, then, Audi and Murphy argue we view integrity as 
integration—as in the integration of, or between elements 
of characteristics and/or virtues. They distinguish between 
two kinds of virtue: Substantive moral virtues (e.g. honesty, 
fairness), which are traits with ‘morally good’ connotations; 
and ‘adjunctive’ virtues (e.g. courage), which do not imme-
diately present a sense of moral sentiment. The argument 
is that integrity (as integration) falls into this second cat-
egory of virtue as adjunctive rather substantive. Courage 
and conscientiousness, for example, are not morally good 
in themselves, yet they provide a means or a form of media-
tion for other moral qualities. As Audi and Murphy put it: 
‘A structure of bricks will not be strong without cement; 
this does not entail that cement is a building block’ (p. 12). 
This metaphorical reference to ‘cement’ (as much as the 
‘building blocks’) is of particular pertinence to this paper. 
The aim—in the context of the marketplace—of bridging 
between notions of integrity and intimacy (in extending 
Kasulis’ account) is to inquire closely into the ‘cement’, into 
how we behave with integrity (rather than seek to pin down 
simply what we mean by integrity). In other words, how 
do we understand the cement as binding agent or medium 
that enables us to engage in a situation with integrity? Such 
a question opens up consideration of how we can empiri-
cally approach integrity as a ‘body’ of living gestures and 
exchanges.
In looking more to the ‘medium’ or mediation of integ-
rity, we need to frame things in a more transactional sense. 
In other words integrity cannot be defined as a static state, 
but always a means of negotiating or integrating between 
states. Such an account is made in Cunliffe and Eriksen’s 
(2011) article on ‘Relational Leadership’. They argue, for 
example, that ‘“Responsibility” is not just something that is 
formalized in job descriptions, directives and policy docu-
ments, but is fundamental to, and situated in, everyday rela-
tionships’ (2011, p. 1439). However, the emphasis here is of 
a more integrated, transactional basis. Cunliffe and Eriksen 
refer to ‘relational integrity’ (2011, p. 1439), which is con-
cerned not just with establishing principles among a group, 
but with the very context in which such principles emerge 
and must be sustained. The idea of situating matters of integ-
rity in the marketplace (indeed in any form of commercial 
exchange) is pertinent, taking us a step further toward inti-
macies of exchange.
Audi and Murphy (2006, p. 13) note, aesthetic sensi-
tivity, imagination, and other such abilities, while good in 
themselves, are not moral virtues. Yet, equally, moral vir-
tues do not govern conduct in isolation from other traits. By 
exploring ethics from the perspective of the adjunctive—of 
integrity as integration—we turn from merely logical pre-
scriptions of moral content to questions of form, medium 
and aesthetics. It is to consider the grounds of ethicality, 
rather than simply ethical statements. It is at this level that 
introducing the term ‘intimacy’ is aimed at focusing on how 
we personally and concretely attend to matters of integrity.
Working towards an account of both integrity and inti-
macy involves new levels of description; to reflect upon the 
aesthetics or means of exchange. In doing so we can attend 
to the micro setting, a reminder that ‘management is mainly 
“people dealing with people”—rather than abstract problem 
solving’ (Solomon 1992, p. 117). Responsibilities remain at 
the level of the individual, Solomon argues, but importantly 
the individual understood within a social setting.
The ethical problems that the average manager faces 
on the job are personnel and routine administrative 
decision-making problems, not policy problems. Some 
of those problems have to do with temptations […] 
Some have to do with conflicts of duties, mixed mes-
sages, crossed loyalties. […] Whatever else business 
ethics may involve and however sophisticated its theo-
ries may become, it means knowing that even such 
decisions (and their consequences) are nevertheless 
one’s own to live with. Ethics is not just a subject for 
executive boards, planning committees, and govern-
ment overseers but for all of us, in the details as well 
as the larger dramas of our everyday lives. (Solomon 
1992, pp. 112–113)
Solomon’s Aristolelean account of business ethics, which 
foregrounds the everyday and our personal fallible engage-
ments, seeks to avoid ‘abstract role-transcendent morality’. 
It is to position against the main rationalist accounts of eth-
ics (i.e. against deontological or duty-defined ethics associ-
ated with Kant, or utilitarian theory associated with John 
Stuart Mill).4 By contrast, Aristotle takes a starting point 
from community and context, arguing that ‘it is cultivation 
of personal character that counts, long before we begin to 
rationalize our actions’ (Solomon 1992, pp. 113–114). In 
4 It is worth noting, Solomon’s (1992, pp. 115–117) account of Aris-
totle’s ‘business ethics’ leads to a form of ‘virtue ethics’, but which he 
positions carefully. He does not wish to be drawn into certain debates 
about ‘tradition’ or ‘community’ as nostalgic terms, nor does he 
accept certain gendered readings, ‘which have drawn a sharp contrast 
between the good warm, feminine virtues of caring and concern and 
the oppressive, impersonal, war-mongering masculine principles of 
justice and duty’ (p. 116). Instead, he draws attention for the need of 
a broader array of characteristics and capabilities that we might culti-
vate. Intimacy we might suppose is one such virtue worth cultivating. 
However, before turning directly to this concept and its interaction 
with matters of integrity, it is first pertinent to identify what is meant 
by integrity in the context of business and the marketplace.
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what will be discussed subsequently in terms of practic-
ing intimacy in the marketplace, the idea of ‘cultivation’ is 
significant. It reminds us that ethics are developmental (not 
transcendental), that we need to learn to articulate and share 
what is ethical. It also suggests a need to foster the right 
environments and social structures to allow ethics to propa-
gate. The cultivation of ethics requires greater depth and 
(shared) ownership, and also pertains to matters of the body 
and of habits (of how we embody ethical conduct). Beyond 
the abstract reports and codes of conduct on ethical practices 
and integrity, it is the complexities of cultivation that are 
critical to an account of integrity and intimacy, combined as 
a way of understanding how, practically and collaboratively, 
we attend appropriately to situations.
Practicing Intimacy
The pairing of ‘intimacy’ with ‘integrity’ leads away from 
a self-contained view of the subject to something closer to 
‘ensemble individualism’ (Sampson 1988); or from inde-
pendent to interdependent views of the self (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991), and importantly turns our attention to 
everyday examples of market exchange. The emphasis here 
is upon how we negotiate practices of both ‘integrity’ and 
‘intimacy’ so as to (co-)exist to form an ‘incident’ or flow of 
individuals connecting with each other. As a matter of integ-
rity, the shop assistant is expected to attend to all customers 
by equal measure. Yet, different rhythms can be at play. The 
experienced shopper, for example, may not wish to be dis-
turbed, while a new customer could benefit from more atten-
tion, yet equally may feel uneasy to ask for help. There are 
various nuanced rhythms and interrelations in play. Reading 
the various signs, allowing for appropriate pauses, or enter-
ing into another’s flow, are all subtle capabilities.
As a certain ‘origin myth’ of the interrelation of buyer 
and seller we can think back to Adam Smith’s famous line 
from Wealth of Nations: ‘It is not from the benevolence of 
the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our din-
ner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address 
ourselves, not to their humanity but their self-love’ (Smith 
2009b, p. 13). The everyday exchanges we can imagine 
between these traders of course gives rise to Smith’s con-
cept of the ‘invisible hand’, the unseen—and often sug-
gested unobservable—market forces that ensure the supply 
and demand of goods achieve natural equilibrium. The point 
here is not to debate the relevant merits of the free market, 
but rather to take note of a specific ‘unit of analysis’ that 
is suggestive from Smith’s evocation of ‘the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker’. In looking to contemporary scenarios, 
we can similarly think about the various sets of interests that 
are assumed in everyday, almost unobservable exchanges. 
Imagine the following brief scenarios or vignettes as ‘inti-
macies’ of the marketplace:
A. Two worlds/tension/potential conflict Standing, waiting 
to pay, with the correct change in my hand, I must wait 
a moment as the person behind the counter jokes with 
their colleague about something that occurred the day 
before. They then turn to me to take my money, but only 
look sideways towards me as they continue to laugh with 
their colleague.
B. One world/relaxed/free to participate At the hair salon, 
as I am guided over to have my hair washed by one 
member of staff, another staff member moves quietly 
across the other side of the room. No words or gestures 
are exchanged, but just prior to being guided back to my 
seat in front of the mirror, someone has placed a drink 
before me.
C. Virtual world/convivial/scripted After some time on the 
phone, having been held in a queue listening to classi-
cal music, I am greeted cheerfully by name. The opera-
tor already has my details on screen as I entered in my 
account number before joining the queue. It turns out 
I cannot be helped today due to a software upgrade. I 
note my dissatisfaction to which the operator apologises 
again before asking ‘is there anything else I can help you 
with today?’
These three scenes describe moments of exchange in 
specific situations and based upon distinct interpersonal 
rhythms. In the case of A, we witness rhythms that are out 
of sync. Ethically speaking, we might ask if it is so wrong 
for the person behind the counter to break from the monot-
ony of work to joke with their colleague. Of course, for the 
customer, this fleeting, incidental moment can quickly feel 
like an eventful one. We become implicated in a situation 
that is not our own. We are subject to a configuration that 
we lack control over. Through the subtle, if unwitting power 
of the attendant, the flow of exchange is disrupted, and an 
unequal relationship is formed, the customer becomes the 
subject of disgruntlement. The case of B, offers a much more 
fluid, harmonious example of integrating bodies. The two 
members of staff and the customer work in unison, or at 
least in sync. Their roles, their individual rhythms, are not 
blurred (the customer is still the customer). Yet, a single 
‘body’ of movement and exchange is enacted, all undertaken 
without explicit direction. We might think of the image of 
a school of fish as they swim collectively, yet each allowing 
for individual ‘tactful’ spaces in-between. In the case of C, 
we might argue there is a similarly well-orchestrated flow of 
interaction, but which in this case still nonetheless leads to a 
less than satisfactory outcome. The failure of the computer 
system is a constraint on both sides—neither can achieve 
what they would expect in the situation. Yet, the operator, 
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habitually trained to provide an established service, cannot 
help but ask whether they can help with anything else that 
day. It is a wholly redundant question in the situation, poorly 
judged and poorly timed.
The three scenarios can be thought of in terms of forms 
of ‘practice’, with reference to Bourdieu’s (1977) account of 
practice and ‘habitus’. The latter term is used to demarcate 
a site of practice between individual decision-making and 
supra-individual ‘structures’; as well as referring to habitual 
or typical, cultivated conditions that relate particularly to the 
body. For Bourdieu practice is located in space and ‘intrinsi-
cally defined by its tempo’ (1977, p. 8), so being something 
‘that can be observed in three dimensions’ (Jenkins 1992, 
p. 69). One of Bourdieu’s key metaphors is the ‘feel for the 
game’, ‘a mastery acquired by experience of the game, and 
one which works outside conscious control and discourse 
(in the way that, for instance, techniques of the body do)’ 
(Bourdieu 1977, p. 61). This is a way of understanding 
anticipation. In tennis, for example, a common error is to 
play the ball (to lunge at it) rather than to play the bounce, 
which is to anticipate the ball in relation to swinging the 
racket. To relate this to the three cases above, it is only in 
the second example, at the hairdressers, that we can see the 
provider appropriately judging the situation. For any pro-
vider the ‘shop’ (or site of business, which can be a virtual 
space such as on the phone or a website etc.) has its own 
integrity, it is established as a setting. Yet, as soon as the 
customer enters into this space it becomes dynamic. In phe-
nomenological terms, the ‘shop’ only ever comes into being 
through the activation of the customer and provider, which 
can take on many different modes depending on how this 
activation occurs. Despite the fact that a business appears 
from afar to be built upon repetitious exchanges, true integ-
rity requires the provider to respond to each and every situ-
ation as it arises.
What is at stake is an aesthetic, spatial and temporal read-
ing of one’s relationship to a situation, or, in relation to the 
account given here in terms of both integrity and intimacy, 
i.e. one’s response-ability to the situation. With regard to 
Bourdieu’s notion of ‘practice’, this is to be considered for 
its fluidity and indeterminacy. We cannot abstractly define or 
predict practice, we can only know about it through doing. 
Bourdieu, for example, refers to ‘necessary improvisation’ 
(1977, p. 8), which, as Jenkins notes, brings us back to time, 
‘improvisation is the exploitation of pause, interval and inde-
cision’ (Jenkins 1992, p. 71). He goes on to argue: ‘Social 
life, in all its complexity and variety, is not accomplished on 
the basis of rules, recipes and normative models. Imagine 
the impossibility, suggests Bourdieu, of having “on file” a 
rule or prescription of every conceivable situation which 
one might encounter in routine social life’ (Jenkins 1992, 
p. 71). Of course, as with scenario C, the call centre (and 
indeed any typical service scenario) is an obvious example 
of where an attempt is made to have ‘on file’, as a script, the 
prescription for every conceivable situation. From a business 
point of view we understand this as a matter of integrity, 
ensuring every individual user can be treated equally and 
to the same level of service. This is a laudable aim, and a 
reason why matters of integrity do indeed matter. Yet the 
scripting of any dialogue with a customer will inevitably fall 
short. There will be instances of ‘deafness’ simply because 
a script cannot predict everything a customer might say (or 
not say). In other words, the script is predicated on talking to 
the customer, not listening to them. The ubiquitous closing 
line of a service operator (‘Is there anything else I can help 
you with?’) is all too often the moment of revelation, when 
the conversation is exposed as a scripted dialogue. The effect 
can be particularly negative—as in scenario C—when the 
customer cannot be helped with an urgent problem, only to 
then be asked what becomes a futile question. Equally, it can 
ring hollow when the customer has been well served and is 
far from needing any further help. The customer, from an 
otherwise natural conversation, is brought back sharp to the 
script, exposing the fact that they are merely the customer. 
It would be easy to shift—to improvise—and respond to 
the fact that the customer is already satisfied by not asking 
a question, and simply acknowledge the (shared) outcome. 
Of course, this may not always be recognised as an ethical 
matter, except that knowing or sensing that one has been 
listened to makes a huge difference in how we understand 
the nature of the situation and our place within it.
Listening is indeed a form of ethics—it implies a whole 
series of considerations of and for the ‘other’ and the means 
of being together. The outsourcing of call centres overseas 
has further refined the rationalising and ‘scripting’ of rela-
tionships. Staff in call centres will receive extensive train-
ing to understand the cultural context to which they are 
servicing and will even adopt aliases in-keeping with the 
customer-base. This represents an intriguing and problem-
atic case of the intertwining of integrity and intimacy. As 
Berkbigler and Dickson (2014) explain, there are varying 
levels of scripting (verbatim, emotional, computerized, and 
flexibility of scripting) designed to uphold the integrity of 
an exchange despite its geographic distance. In seeking to 
be ‘true’ to the context of the consumer there is the affecta-
tion of intimacy. For workers this has shown high levels 
of stress, particularly where scripting involves flexibility 
(Bigler and Dickson 2014) or, as termed here, anticipation 
and improvisation. Various businesses using overseas ser-
vices have acknowledged many customers are not happy 
with the level of service.5 What is apparent is that it is hard 
5 The UK’s telecoms company, British Telecom (BT), for example, 
recently pledged £80 m, recruiting up to 1000 staff, to ensure at least 
80% of its calls are answered from the UK (Davis 2016). The change 
in practice has come after Ofcom, the UK’s telecoms regulator, iden-
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to simulate intimacy or proximity. As an ethical condition 
it is something that must be both genuinely expressed and 
felt. Listening, anticipating and improvising are all part of 
the means, the medium, through which a company maintains 
its relationship with the customer. By triangulating Kasulis’ 
cultural philosophy, Bourdieu’s notion of practice, and the 
broader Aristotlean view of culture as cultivation, there is 
a way in which we might nurture senses of intimacy. This 
refers to an on-going, lived process or practice, rather than 
a set of task-based rules that can be learnt.
In thinking with the above examples (scenarios A–C), 
specific aspects of intimacy can be drawn out. First, mat-
ters of proximity, i.e. how we respond to others through 
an awareness of space and the environment or situation in 
which we find ourselves. Second, of a more temporal nature 
is the ability to anticipate, to be aware of what can occur 
following our actions or that of others. Third, connecting 
with both spatial and temporal awareness is improvisation, 
an ability to respond appropriately in and through a given 
situation. The service provider will typically be cognisant 
of any given situation as a set of spatial and temporal con-
nections. To frame this as a form of ethics, we can think 
of intimacy as being ‘closely acquainted’; to place oneself 
in a position to find out about or be responsive to a person 
or situation. Furthermore, the position taken by this paper 
is to understand intimacy as bound up with the concept of 
integrity (with a view to expand how we practically engage 
with ‘everyday’ business ethics). Rather than simply tem-
pering what we mean by integrity (when defined as sub-
stantive moral virtues, as discussed earlier in this paper), 
the introduction of intimacy is to understand how we actu-
ally perform integrity; and crucially it is not rooted in the 
individual, but always as an exchange between others. In 
this way, integrity needs its intimacy: we need to find the 
means to be mindful and responsive to the incidental if we 
are to be eventful in our actions and interactions. Overall, 
then, in thinking through how we interact in—and indeed 
practice—social-business exchanges we need to consider an 
Integrity-Intimacy Approach, which is to find ways to prop-
erly associate principles with practices of being together.
Integrity‑Intimacy Approach
Smith’s famous line of the ‘benevolence’ of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, is all too often read as the symptom 
of mere calculation. However, this is to assume an atom-
istic account of the individuals involved in the exchange. 
The relationship is defined as one of the equidistance of 
bodies/subjects, so suggestive of a relation to one another, 
not a relation between each other. By contrast, in Kasulis’ 
Intimacy or Integrity (2002), the difference is expressed 
as either a ‘belonging to’ or a ‘belonging with’. He gives 
an example of having one’s wallet stolen, which contains 
both money and treasured family photos. While the money 
belonged to you, he notes, the ‘pictures belonged with you 
not to you. In taking the photos, the thief stole part of your 
self, not merely something external like money over which 
you held temporary title’ (p. 23). In setting out a contrast 
between integrity (as befitting the account given in this 
paper) and intimacy, Kasulis uses this sense of ‘belonging-
with’ to identify a difference between external relations 
(associated with integrity) and internal relations (associated 
with intimacy): ‘In an external relation, the relatents (the 
things in relation to each other) exist independently. […] 
In an internal relation, by contrast, it is part of the essential 
nature of the relatents that they are connected as they are; 
they are interdependent, not independent, entities’ (p. 36). 
Put simply, we might say integrity is a quality that pertains 
to ourselves, while intimacy is never our own.
As with the earlier image of a school of fish, elements 
can be distinct in themselves, yet hold together as a single 
form. A key aspect of intimacy is this notion of ‘belonging-
with’, ‘the self and other belong together in a way that does 
not sharply distinguish the two’ (Kasulis 2002, p. 32). This 
establishes an important underlying principle. If we read the 
situation of the butcher and customer as a matter of intimacy 
(even if only temporarily for the duration of an exchange), 
we immediately change our perspective on the unit of analy-
sis, which becomes a singular, or at least joined-up choreo-
graphed ‘body’, rather than two distinct individuals; we can-
not separate one from the other. In line with Smith’s (2009a) 
thinking on the role of the conscience and sympathy, which 
leads to his theory of moral sentiment—or even sentience—
there are two related aspects to intimacy: empathetic imagi-
nation and embodiment. The notion of ‘belonging-with’ 
suggests of an ability to step outside of ourselves, and/or to 
remain a part of something. This is evident with scenario B 
as a whole or integrated form; it is unbalanced in scenario 
A where the service provider chooses to belong more with 
their colleague than their customer; and in scenario C it is 
arguably that ‘belonging-with’ is over-played or simulated. 
What is at stake is a set of rhythms for engagement and tacit 
knowledge. As Kasulis points out ‘knowledge is generally 
transmitted or taught in a nondiscursive way’ (2002, p. 40), 
but that it plays an important role in ‘the development of 
morality, technical skill with a tool, and aesthetic sensitivity. 
[…T]here is not only empirical observation and logical rea-
soning; there is also an emotive identification with a person 
or the use of an object’ (2002, p. 41). As an embodiment 
of knowledge, this can be said to relate to the Aristotlean 
Footnote 5 (continued)
tified BT as one of the worst companies in the industry; it can be con-
sidered then a strategy towards ‘intimacy’ in order to uphold integrity.
259Response-Ability: Practicing Integrity Through Intimacy in the Marketplace 
1 3
‘cultivation’ of characteristics that Solomon refers to, which 
exist over time, can be shared in various indirect ways, and 
which operate in as much implicit as in explicit ways.
Ideas about aesthetic sensitivity and the body have had 
a clear impact on the retail sector, particularly where busi-
nesses need to rethink the purpose and status of face-to-
face interaction following the rise of Internet services. The 
ability to book our own tailored travel arrangements online 
has inevitably impacted on travel agents. One response has 
been to design shops to appear more like a lounge, to allow 
customers to effectively book their travel on computers as 
they might at home. The removal of counters and staff-
operated computers creates a more horizontal relationship 
between those serving and being served, effectively altering 
the ethicality of exchange. It is no longer about attending to, 
but being with another. Surprisingly, the banking sector is 
also going in a similar direction. While we might associate 
notions of traditionalism and hierarchy with those ordained 
to look after our money, the dominance of Internet-based 
services is leading this sector to re-stage its operations. Mil-
ligan (2016) notes that while we typically hear of the wide-
spread closure of branches, in 2017 three British banks were 
due to open more branches than they would close. These new 
and/or refurbished branches, however, tend to look more like 
cafes than banks. Similarly, in the US, Capital One, which 
launched as a digital-only bank, has thirteen banking ‘cafes’ 
across the country. The aesthetic arrangements and handling 
or staging of environments in which we come together for 
exchange can in themselves help cultivate certain habits, and 
the embodiment of proximity, anticipation, and improvisa-
tion. Entering into a bank for a coffee, for example, imme-
diately establishes a different kind of engagement. The cus-
tomer is likely to sit down, to be receptive to dialogue and 
to take more time over the purpose of their visit.
Kasulis also refers to intimacy as esoteric, by which he 
means that like tacit knowledge, intimacy is not immediately 
obvious (or communicable) and must be gained over a period 
of time and through learning—and even then, crucially, we 
do not necessarily have clear access to an understanding, it 
is just something we can do (or at least we are ‘cultivated’ 
to able to do). He gives the example of a sportsperson able 
to perform a feat of great skill and timing, without neces-
sarily being able to explain or even describe it. Underlying 
all is a final key characteristic of intimacy: it is personal, not 
public, yet it is objective. Kasulis gives various instructive 
examples to explain this point. For example, a physician is 
able to discern a particular diagnosis when viewing an X-ray, 
while the untrained eye would see only cloudy shapes. The 
X-ray offers empirical evidence, yet this is not something 
that can be read by anyone. Similarly, a judge at a gymnas-
tics event is able to read the various elements of a routine to 
give a fair score. There is a speed and agility to this assess-
ment (that matches the routine of the gymnast themselves). 
‘In such sporting events as gymnastics, figure-skating, surf-
ing, and diving’, Kasulis notes, ‘the score for the degree-of-
difficulty of a performance is usually a publicly verifiable 
judgement based on the empirically observable sequence of 
movements. Given a detailed rulebook and a videotape of 
the performance, even a novice to the field should be able 
to determine such a score’ (2002, p. 34). The idea here of a 
public, empirically verifiable judgment makes for an impor-
tant principle to be transposed to the business context. While 
there is arguably a subtle ‘art’ to staging the business setting 
and guiding for the right kinds of interaction with customers, 
placing greater scrutiny and investment upon such matters 
should yield greater expertise. I.e. intimacy, in the sense 
identified here, is not merely instinctive, but rather defines a 
form of practice, for which we can train, display and verify.
If we think back to the scenarios outlined above, A (stand-
ing before the cashier), B (waited on at the hair salon) and C 
(engaging with a phone operator), in which the failures and 
success of intimacy are evident, we can argue (in line with 
Kasulis’ account of the objectivity of intimacy) that the inti-
mate knowledge of scenario B could find its equivalence in 
scenarios A and C. In the case of A, for example, the cashier 
only needs to be aware of the relative proximity of the cus-
tomer and to better anticipate actions (which may or may not 
allow time for an aside with their colleague, depending on 
the flow of engagements). Similarly, the operator described 
in scenario C, while needing to deal with an obviously diffi-
cult situation in which the computer is not working, needs to 
better anticipate and empathise with the callers frustration. 
This requires improvisation, which again, is to be attuned 
to the lived rhythms of the situation. Nonetheless, these 
are often difficult and subtle adjustments that are required. 
It involves accessing private, imaginative, embodied, and 
esoteric forms of knowledge. Yet, importantly, these knowl-
edges do have an empirical basis. If, for example, we slow 
down the videotape of the gymnast we can locate the same 
empirically observable sequence of movements that the 
expert judge is able to read in real time. This account of 
intimacy implies the need for long-term engagement and 
exposure. It is a form of learning that goes beyond discursive 
knowledge exchange, thus contrasting with integrity, which 
can be communicated more directly. Integrity is exchange-
able, making it the dominant ‘currency’ for how we assess 
business ethics, while it is through its intimate cultivation 
that integrity sustains.
Kasulis’ (2002) account of the differing orientations of 
integrity and intimacy suggests of one being made domi-
nant over the other, which he describes in terms of a cul-
tural ideology, or, to use his metaphor an ‘operating system’ 
on which more complex ‘programs’ can run. In this sense, 
integrity and intimacy represent philosophical systems that 
determine how we tend to think about the world, ourselves 
and society (p. 71). This leads to the suggestion that the 
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differing emphasis of integrity/intimacy is culturally spe-
cific (though he argues strongly against cultural essential-
ism). The key point is that cultures—and more particularly 
subcultures and institutional groups (such as managers or 
employees)—can foreground different principles, ‘one can 
at least imagine a culture that places a primary, rather than 
secondary, value on the enhancement of intimacy’ (p. 51). 
Note, however, the position taken by this paper implies a cri-
tique of Kasulis’ binary opposition, since the argument made 
is that we need both. Considered deconstructively, neither 
holds without the other. In thinking practically about man-
aging the marketplace for the better, we need to observe the 
day-to-day, to consider mood, tone, and habits, as much as 
there is a need to audit for principles of practice. In seeking 
to resolve ethical tensions, or indeed in seeking to prevent 
them in the first place, it is necessary to understand what is 
being exchanged, and crucially how things are exchanged. 
It is important to acknowledge the ‘response-abilities’ of all 
actors and mechanisms involved in the exchange. It is worth 
noting the ubiquity of social media has led to a more col-
lective or ‘horizontal’ nature of marketing, which typically 
underscores how it is counter-productive to deceive or pres-
sure the consumer. In terms similar to Kasulis, Abela and 
Murphy (2008) suggest a shift is required to frame the busi-
ness to customer relationship not as ‘doing to’ (with integ-
rity) but as ‘doing with’ (as both integrity and intimacy). 
Significantly, the inclusion of intimacy as a measurable or at 
least observable dimension, while undoubtedly subtle, offers 
further import. It helps us return to the occasion when peo-
ple consider what others feel; and if only to be situated with 
regard to the kinds of incidences of empathy that Smith drew 
our attention to centuries before.
Research and Managerial Implications
The foregoing account of the intimacies of integrity in eve-
ryday market exchanges can lead us to three inter-related 
research and managerial implications. In the first instance, 
it is incumbent on businesses (and their managers) to pay 
ever-greater attention to the spatial and temporal dynamics 
and proximities of the exchanges they invoke. This relates 
to the physical environment (i.e. how consumer spaces are 
designed for interactions with customers, rather than simply 
transactions) also virtual environments or interactions (e.g. 
online customer help), and gestural forms of exchange that 
allow a customer to feel part of a wider whole. There is a 
good deal of interest in the design and operational man-
agement of consumer spaces, but typically the focus is on 
aspects of efficiency in service delivery, the communica-
tion of corporate identity or brand, and the offer of certain 
moods and atmosphere. The suggestion here is the need to 
combine this understanding of spatial/temporal designs with 
maintaining integrity through intimacies of exchange. I.e. to 
develop a more granular analysis of situations.
The need to get in closer to situations of exchange pre-
sents new methodological considerations. We cannot simply 
describe and/or reframe matters of integrity through prin-
ciples. It is necessary to understand how situations unfold 
intimately, which is to engage empirically with a different 
unit of analysis, which, fundamentally, we can relate to in 
terms of ‘rhythms’. While beyond the purview of this current 
article, it is worth noting that the relatively recent posthu-
mous publication (in English) of Henri Lefebvre’s Rhyth-
manalysis (2013) marks a wider interest in recent critical 
theory. The European research network, Rhuthmos,6 makes 
a strong case for the pertinence of rhythmanalysis at our 
current conjuncture. In ‘A Short History of Rhythm Theory 
Since the 1970s’ (2011), for example, Michon demonstrates 
how questions of rhythm were always present in twentieth 
century European philosophy (and dating back to ancient 
philosophy), but have come back much more forcefully 
today. The argument made is that on the one hand the force 
of post-structuralist theory is much less significant today (if 
only because the critical ideas have been readily subsumed 
into a more critically aware culture); while on the other 
hand, the previously implicit interest in rhythm has become 
much more relevant in the context of our rapidly changing 
and data-driven society. The genre of critical management 
studies has been important in bringing across to business 
the key ideas of poststructuralist critical theory, however, 
these literatures tend to work with broad-brush accounts and 
remain within the ‘grand narratives’ of Marxism, feminism, 
institutional discourse and anti-foundationalism more gen-
erally. The suggestions made here regarding ‘practices of 
intimacy’ can be taken to implicate a new level of critical 
reading and its application in the context of business. Cer-
tainly, rhythm analysis represents a fertile avenue for future, 
interdisciplinary research.
Finally, on a practical level, the import of an ‘intimate’ 
analysis (through new methodological approaches) can ena-
ble businesses to rethink how they design and cultivate their 
relationship with stakeholders. It is possible, for example, to 
re-visit training, to get away from rule-based understanding 
in favour of improvisation, with the aim to be responsive as 
much as responsible, by which we can understand a need to 
extend our ‘response-abilities’ (so for example to be able to 
respond to a situation by attending to proximities). Crucially, 
such training cannot be delivered as goal-orientated. In the 
Aristotelian tradition, intimacies of integrity require the 
6 The European research network Rhuthmos (http://rhuth mos.eu), 
under the direction of Pascal Michon, offers an international and 
transdisciplinary research platform on rhythms in the sciences, phi-
losophies and the arts.
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cultivation of community rather than organisational cohe-
sion. The pursuit of the ‘good life’ requires that there is a 
form of living to begin with. It is at this level that intimacy 
broaches a way of thinking and acting, which we can observe 
and be trained for, but which is a means towards ethical 
engagement rather than ethical content itself. The underly-
ing point for businesses is to understand integrity not merely 
as a measuring stick, but as a dynamic process that takes 
place through the medium of exchange. The implication for 
managers is the need to pay greater attention on an everyday 
basis to the medium of exchange. Painter-Morland makes 
reference to Nietzsche’s account of ‘responsibility-debt’, 
which often emerges through the reactive forces found in 
training and selection processes. This is to refer to a type of 
responsibility that ‘belongs to a role, or arises out of guilt’ 
(2011, p. 90). The idea of engendering a greater sense of 
‘intimacy’ through training ought to go beyond any mecha-
nistic, didactic approach to train for intimacy. It requires 
a more extended and interactive or shared process of cul-
tivation. Nonetheless, a nuanced and relational reading of 
situations can lead to a more adept choreographing of the 
customer experience, offering greater flexibility through 
employee training, and more generally the cultivation of 
‘response-abilities’.
Conclusion
The paper addresses the problem of pursuing good practice 
in business ethics by thinking about the ‘how’ or ‘medium’ 
of our everyday actions within the context of commercial 
exchange. Relying only on the idea of the integrity of a 
system, and the corresponding research and investment 
related to the pursuit of integrity, is arguably only to lead to 
failure (or to varying forms of so-called greenwash report-
ing). Through various examples of the business setting, it is 
argued that everyday considerations of proximity and stag-
ing, along with our abilities (and willingness) to anticipate 
and improvise within situations, can change the nature of 
outcomes. Crucially, paying attention to outcomes as a com-
prehensive, cultivated process, leads us to question how we 
achieve our actions. In this regard, intimacy as a critical 
concept is important to combine with any account of, or 
aspiration towards, integrity.
Traced in relation to critical management literatures, inti-
macy can be seen to add, pragmatically, to post-structuralist 
accounts of business, in this case to open up ideas of respon-
siveness or ‘response-abilities’, as opposed simply to respon-
sibilities. The term provides a means of identifying practical, 
if subtle, attributes and practices at an interpersonal level, to 
relate always to the interaction with others. Even in a simple 
setting such as a café, service is not simply the correct serving 
of a drink (as a matter of integrity), but the serving of ‘service’ 
itself. There is a manner of purveying the drink to another that 
is inherently an ethical exchange; an exchange of what it means 
to live appropriately, to live a good life not just for oneself but 
necessarily with others. From the Ancient Greek ethikos, we 
derive the word ethos, which refers to habit and custom. Inti-
macy allows us to think and look critically and empirically at 
the level of habit and the everyday, which we can then combine 
with an understanding of integrity as ethical systems that busi-
nesses seek to ‘employ’.
The idea of intimacy in business exchanges, as character-
ised in this paper, might suggest of the need for higher levels 
of staffing and/or higher quality training. This is too simple an 
equation, but certainly it responds in a particular way to the 
tension between efficiency and effectiveness in business. It can 
be efficient to reduce staff, but in the long run this can impact 
on effectiveness. Equally, of course, having too many staff in 
a situation (‘too many cooks’) may impede effectiveness. As 
outlined in the aforementioned implications, there are various 
spatial and temporal considerations that can be made of situ-
ations of exchange, as well as differing rhythms to which we 
can pay attention, and which can be observed if we take the 
time to do so. The point about intimacy—as with the case of 
watching the gymnast—is that we can seek to better observe 
how a situation operates or unfolds, and so then to discern 
appropriate requirements. To apply a greater sense of intimacy 
in regard to integrity (achieved through matters of proxim-
ity, anticipation and improvisation) leads us towards a shift in 
ethical thinking. Businesses need to align with others, to make 
their customers’ (and other stakeholders’) issues become their 
own, so as to be shared. It is important, then, to respond to and/
or pre-empt problems, which requires being as responsive to 
a situation as those whom we wish to be responsible towards. 
Thus, being able to anticipate, accommodate and respond to 
others (to adopt relational concerns) is a response-ability we 
ought to pursue, as part of the pursuit of integrity.
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